SITUATION IN LEBANON

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BEFORE THE

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SITUATION IN LEBANON

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1982

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Boschwitz, Pell, Biden, Glenn, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome you, Mr. Secretary, this morning, appearing while the President and Secretary of State are on a very important, timely mission to Latin America. We certainly welcome you this morning as Acting Secretary. It is appropriate that the committee be brought up to date on the situation in Lebanon.

It has been some time since the committee has been able to exchange views with the administration on Lebanon, and we think it in the public interest that we have a discussion of some of the problems and challenges that we are encountering in that very difficult area. We hope that in addition to describing the current negotiations regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops and the efforts to bring stability to Lebanon, Secretary Dam, we would very much appreciate your discussing the administration's overall strategy for the area.

The administration's basic goals in Lebanon have been stated to be the withdrawal of all foreign forces and assisting in the re-establishment of the authority of the Lebanese Central Government throughout the nation. After 8 years of civil war and foreign occupation, the Lebanese Government is likely to have difficulties in securing the withdrawal of foreign forces and asserting its authority without outside assistance. The government of Amin Gemayel consequently looks to the United States to help provide political, economic, and military assistance in attaining these goals.

Hopes for re-establishing the authority of the central government throughout Lebanon rest heavily on the Lebanese Army. The reoccupation of Beirut following the withdrawal of the Israeli Army has reportedly tested its resources. The United States is committed to help reconstitute, retrain, and re-equip the armed forces of Lebanon.

A venue has not even been established for discussions leading to the withdrawal of foreign forces, as I understand it. The apparent lack of progress in attaining the basic goals is a legitimate concern of all of us. This raises the question of whether we are increasing our commitment in a situation in which there is not really much light at the end of the tunnel.

The extent of our commitment to Lebanon is not clear. Our marines have now been in Beirut for more than 2 months. Their area of activity

has been increased to include East Beirut. Our marines are acquitting themselves with dignity and honor. I was pleased to have had the opportunity to visit with them, talk with them, and I can testify to the very, very high quality of our forces there. They are performing a significant role in preserving order in Beirut. It is no wonder President Gemayel has requested an expansion of this force.

Before considering the expansion of their mission, we must fully understand our goals and objectives. Consultations with Congress must be close and timely, and we very much appreciate your meeting with us today. We will be most interested in hearing the administration's views on this.

First, Senator Pell, we would be happy to hear from you.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with you in welcoming Mr. Dam before our committee today. It is very important that the United States do all it can to open the way to withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the re-establishment of the authority of the Lebanese Government and the military. But I hope that the Acting Secretary will be as frank as possible in assessing the present situation, and in giving his judgment as to what challenges must be overcome.

The Lebanese Government has asked that we expand the role of our American forces there. I believe our committee needs to learn exactly what American forces are presently doing in Lebanon and what, if any, expansion of the military the administration feels that it must do to comply with the Lebanese request.

We also need to know if Congress will be notified under the War Powers Act of any proposed changes in our military in Lebanon. I hope too that the Acting Secretary will be clear as to the degree of consultation with this committee and the Congress the administration is prepared to undertake with regard to a continued or expanded American troop presence in Lebanon.

And finally, I would like to touch on this delicate question of the PLO who have been removed from Beirut. I understand that while the leaders have stayed away from Lebanon, it is possible that many of the fighters may have come back to the Bekaa and to northern Lebanon. And these are the points that I would hope would be covered by the Secretary in the questions and answers afterward.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Secretary Dam, we would be happy to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH W. DAM, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary DAM. Thank you very much. I have a prepared statement which I would like to read, and I of course am open to questions. If I do not touch on all of the points directly that you have raised, I am sure you will ask me and I will be pleased to respond.

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to appear before this committee today to discuss our efforts to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. As you know, these efforts involve a resolution of the conflict in Lebanon and the search for comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Our Government is approaching these two problems on separate

tracks, but there is an obvious relationship between them. That relationship is symbolized by the President's appointment of Ambassador Philip Habib as his Special Representative with a new mandate involving both Lebanon and the broader peace process.

These endeavors are a matter of high national priority. In the absence of substantial progress toward peace in Lebanon and in the region as a whole, we can anticipate continued unrest in the Middle East, threatening U.S. and Western interests and endangering the security of Israel.

The task is complicated and our responsibility is great. Of all the powers external to the region, only the United States has the credibility to deal with the issues in a fair and equitable manner. Our reputation for dealing honestly and pragmatically with regional conflicts is an asset of great importance. We cannot afford to squander it.

Let me now turn to a more detailed discussion of the current status of our efforts first in Lebanon and then with regard to the Middle East peace process.

A critical test for American diplomacy is in Lebanon. Our objective is straightforward. We seek to restore Lebanese sovereignty and to insure Israeli security. These are not separate objectives. A stable, sovereign Lebanon and a secure Israel are two sides of the same coin. The threat to Israel does not come from the Lebanese people, but from foreign forces that have usurped Lebanese sovereignty and are still camped on Lebanese soil.

It follows that a peaceful Lebanon, free of all foreign forces and sovereign over all its territory, will make a major contribution to Israeli security. To achieve this objective, we and the responsible international community support a three-part strategy in Lebanon:

First, withdrawal forthwith of all foreign forces from Lebanon;

Second, restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces;

And third, re-establishment of a Lebanese national consensus and reconstruction of the Lebanese economy.

This strategy in support of the Lebanese Government is designed to achieve peace and security for both Lebanon and Israel. The withdrawal of all foreign forces will remove a threat to Israel's border. Restoring Lebanon's sovereignty and strength and rebuilding its economy will prevent that threat from returning. The United States is moving now to implement all three parts of this strategy.

America's diplomatic energy is focused on bringing about the immediate withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces—Israeli, Syrian, and PLO. To succeed, we must meet the legitimate interests of each of the parties through practical security arrangements. Three sets of negotiations will be involved: negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and between Lebanon and the PLO.

It is a fact that none of these talks has begun. The Israeli-Lebanese negotiations could provide a stimulus for the others, but they have been stalled by debate over the level and location of the talks. Last week President Gemayel proposed a compromise solution on the diplomatic level of these negotiations. The Israeli Cabinet recently adopted that solution, but it remained firm in its insistence that the talks take place in Beirut and Jerusalem.

The current Israeli position is unacceptable to the Lebanese Government. The success and stability of that Government depends on the support of those within Lebanon and throughout the Arab world, for whom the status of Jerusalem remains a critical issue. The United States acknowledges the importance of Jerusalem to Israel and to all Arab States. But insistence on a Jerusalem venue should not be made an obstacle to the start of talks on the withdrawal of external forces from Lebanon.

The present situation is clearly intolerable. Syrian, PLO and Israeli forces remain poised in the field. The continued occupation of Lebanon by foreign forces—forces that imperil Lebanese sovereignty and threaten Israeli security—is dangerous and should be unacceptable to the parties. President Reagan is determined to see the parties get the dispute out of the trenches and onto the table. Wrangling over procedures must end, and substantive negotiations must begin.

Once the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon begins, a vacuum may be left that could endanger Lebanese sovereignty and Israeli security. The Lebanese Armed Forces will not be able immediately to fill that vacuum, although we and our allies will be working to rebuild those forces. Consequently, it may be necessary for the United States to consider joining with other nations in an expanded multinational force.

Indeed, the Lebanese Government has recently made such a request. An expanded multinational force [MNF] would bolster the parties' confidence in security arrangements that will facilitate the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

We will, of course, consult closely with the members of this committee in addressing the question of U.S. participation in an expanded MNF. It is too early at this time to specify the details of any international peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

A fully sovereign Lebanon and a secure Israel, however, cannot be achieved through military measures alone. The once dynamic economy of Lebanon must be restored. Therefore, we may have to return to the new Congress with a supplemental request for the funds necessary to enable the United States to play an appropriate role in the reconstruction of Lebanon. Only a healthy Lebanese economy and a thriving private sector can provide the prosperity that is an essential adjunct to our security and economic assistance.

Using available military credits and Lebanon's own funds, we have started a crash military assistance program to help the Lebanese Army assert its authority throughout the country and thereby enable the MNF to depart. We envisage the need for some additional funding and, as our estimates are developed, we may wish to seek foreign military sales and international military education training funds in a supplemental request.

Let me now turn to the status of the Middle East peace process. The President's historic initiative of September 1 is designed to bring about a just and lasting peace that will satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and at the same time assure the security of Israel. To achieve these ends, the initiative seeks to broaden the circle of peace through the participation of Jordan and Palestinian representation consistent with the Camp David framework.

Before reviewing the current status of the President's initiative, I should like to comment on two key aspects. First, the September 1

initiative is not a "plan" or blueprint to be imposed on the parties. Rather, the President has put forward a balanced set of positions that the United States is prepared to support in the course of negotiations. We have pointed out that we cannot guarantee the outcome of the negotiating process on any specific issue. The negotiations, if they are to be successful, must be free to move in productive directions that cannot be foreseen in advance.

It has been made clear to all parties involved that these are our positions and that we stand firmly behind them. Should the parties agree on positions at variance with our proposals, however, we will not blindly stand our ground.

Second, the President's positions regarding the final status of the West Bank and Gaza have generated much interest and commentary. This is understandable since the future of those territories is of keen interest to Palestinians and Israelis alike. It is for this reason that the President felt it necessary to state that the United States would support neither an independent Palestinian state nor Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and Gaza.

It is important to note, however, that when negotiations resume the next item on the agenda will not be the ultimate status of the territories, but rather the transitional arrangements to be established in the West Bank and Gaza for a 5-year period. Only after that transitional period has begun can negotiations be undertaken on the final status of the territories.

What, then, is the status of the President's initiative? We have had a highly constructive visit by a delegation representing the Arab League, and we have seen positive movement in the direction the President has outlined. King Hussein has publicly stated his willingness to discuss the proposals, and a serious dialog between Jordan and the PLO is continuing. We remain hopeful that this activity will lead to an early move to the negotiating table by Jordan, with the support of other key Arab parties.

Egypt has been publicly supportive of the President's initiative. The Israel Government, as you are aware, has been and remains highly critical of some aspects of the President's proposals. Those proposals, however, continue to receive intense attention in Israel by the government and the public alike. And if King Hussein comes to the table, we are confident that the Israeli Government will not refuse to negotiate.

I am optimistic that the President's initiative will soon lead to a resumption of negotiations with broadened participation. My optimism is based on my conviction that the President's initiative provides the best means to move toward a peace that will meet the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and at the same time assure the security which Israel so avidly seeks and so richly deserves.

I should like to conclude my remarks by mentioning the problem of Israel's relations with Egypt. There is important, unfinished business with regard to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. The Taba border area between Israel and Egypt remains contested. It is now time to resolve this issue according to the provisions of the treaty, just as it is now time to place the various elements of the broader peace process on a firm foundation.

Mr. Chairman, Americans can take pride in our policy toward the Middle East. It is a policy which has been developed in consultation with this committee and other Members of Congress. We welcome this

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continuing consultation. It strengthens our policy and contributes to an American consensus.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Dam. From the tone of your remarks this morning, I would say there is some hope.

We will, with the four of us here now, go on a 10-minute rule, without objection.

You have commented on the legitimate interests of all of the parties involved and have mentioned particularly the security problems that Israel faces. The Israelis are asking for reasonable security arrangements for their northern border.

Could you describe for us what you visualize as the arrangements that that could entail? How long might it take to work this out?

Secretary DAM. I do not think that there is any substantial amount of controversy about security arrangements in southern Lebanon. Presumably, there would be a security zone of 40 to 50 kilometers north of the border, and there would be some specific details to be worked out about the exact line and what specific rules would govern within that area. But that has not been in my judgment a matter of great controversy.

The CHAIRMAN. We have talked about the format for Lebanese-Israeli discussions. Even if Israeli-Lebanese differences on format are resolved, how are Syrian and Palestinian views going to be brought into the discussions?

Secretary DAM. First of all, there will have to be negotiations between Lebanon and Syria and between Lebanon and the PLO. We certainly have been in touch with the Syrians on a number of occasions about this, and the Syrians are prepared to sit down and discuss the timing of their withdrawal.

The Lebanese have been in contact as well with the PLO, although I cannot announce any real progress in those negotiations at this time. Of course, as you know, we ourselves are not in touch with the PLO.

The CHAIRMAN. You have mentioned the historic September 1 proposal by the President, and I concur that it is historic and it should be the basis for serious negotiations. I have concurred completely for a decade with the decision, the position taken by the President that it is impractical to think in terms of a sovereign Palestinian state, but it is also impractical for there ever to be peace in the area unless we talk about a Palestinian homeland, an entity. I have always felt federation with Jordan was the most practical way to do it.

You mentioned in your testimony that serious dialog is going on in Jordan between King Hussein and the PLO, represented by Yasser Arafat. Is there anything that you can tell the committee in open session as to whether or not there is recognition by the PLO that their objective and goal of a sovereign national state is something that simply will not be supported by this Government, will not be supported by the Congress? Is there some indication that there is an understanding of that now, at least by the PLO, and a willingness to talk about it?

Secretary DAM. I am not able to report anything concrete in that respect. However, it is apparent that the PLO through Arafat's discussions with Hussein, is talking about how negotiations with Israel can occur. Certainly King Hussein is interested in how nego-

tiations might be carried on with Israel to reach a comprehensive settlement to this problem, and particularly with regard to the West Bank and Gaza.

I think that is a big advance. I would not expect the PLO to say that they were abandoning their goals. So all we have is indirect evidence that there is a lot of progress in the direction I indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can go back to your comments on troop withdrawal, the goal was the total withdrawal of all forces by year end. When does the administration actually believe the next withdrawal of foreign troops can take place? Is there any timeframe and is there any hope now that our original goal of having all external forces out by year end has any chance at all?

Secretary DAM. It remains our goal. But as you suggest, if the talks do not begin immediately the time will simply run out. It seems to me that if we were to have talks immediately there would still be some possibility. The country is not all that large and it would not take all that long for the troops to be withdrawn.

The problem is not so much the withdrawal of the foreign forces as the fact that there are three sets of negotiations that inevitably have to proceed at the same time as well as the fact that other issues are being raised concerning normalization of relations. So that process necessarily takes a certain amount of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you want to hazard a guess as to when we might expect, reasonably expect all forces to be withdrawn?

Secretary DAM. I would not want to hazard a guess, but I continue to be optimistic that if the talks can get started, we are not talking about all that long a time.

The CHAIRMAN. In the foreseeable future?

Secretary DAM. Yes; certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I get your views on the investigations that are being carried on? We know a great deal about the Israeli investigation of massacres because it is an absolutely open society, and full reporting has taken place on that. The Lebanese attorney general is conducting a secret investigation, and there are indications that a dozen Lebanese, mostly Shi'ites from southern Lebanon, have been arrested. Can you tell us something about the Lebanese attorney general's investigation of the September massacre at the Palestinian camps, and what we do know about that?

Secretary DAM. I really have nothing to report on that. First of all, it is something that they are doing by themselves. They are not using the same kinds of open hearings and so forth that we see in Israel, and it is an internal matter of the Lebanese Government. I certainly would be reluctant to try to intervene in that process, so I have nothing to report.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment, is there any likelihood that if the press reports are correct, that a dozen have been arrested already, that it should not be hard to ascertain who actually committed the massacres among the Lebanese forces? Is there any reason to believe that they will be punished? Have we discussed this with the Lebanese Government, and have we discussed with them the importance of them establishing credibility and punishing those who committed crimes?

Secretary DAM. We certainly take the question very seriously. I am sure that there must have been, in the nature of things, some early dis-

cussions, but now they have their own processes, and we are not trying to steer those processes. We believe it is important that we show confidence in the new Lebanese Government in every way. As I said in my prepared statement, the success of that government is crucial to the resolution of the Lebanon problem.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to be kept up to date on that.

Secretary DAM. We will certainly endeavor to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. We would also be very much interested—a number of committee members have evidenced their interest—in the relationship of our troops in Lebanon and the War Powers Act. Is it still the view of the Reagan administration that the situation in Lebanon is not one in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances? That is, so far as U.S. forces are concerned? What factors do you consider in making this continuing determination?

Secretary DAM. The crucial language is the language that you referred to—the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Certainly there have been no hostilities that U.S. forces have been involved in, nor do we see anything in the situation where they are now which would indicate that there will be any such hostilities.

There have not been shots fired in anger. There is no proposal to move them into an area where they would confront hostile forces. These are the circumstances that we look at.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, if U.S. forces should become involved in a situation which would clearly or actually involve imminent hostilities, is the President prepared to report that fact to Congress and to seek specific authorization to remain beyond an additional 60-day period?

Secretary DAM. Certainly, we will. We plan to abide by the resolution, and that means that if we are introducing forces into a situation defined by the hostilities language that I just read, then of course we would make a report. In the meantime, we would continue to consult with this committee about the disposition of U.S. forces.

The CHAIRMAN.I thank you very much, and I will just repeat that I have supported the President's decision to have U.S. forces in Lebanon. I think it is absolutely essential. There would be no possibility of restoring stability to that country without U.S. forces, and the extraordinarily fine forces that I saw from our allies there on my recent visit. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, how correct is the report that many of the fighters, not the leaders, but the fighters, the PLO fighters have returned to the northern part of Lebanon and Bekaa after having been removed originally by a vessel from Beirut?

Secretary DAM. I did not hear the last part of your question.

Senator PELL. I say, how true is the report that there are many PLO who have—the fighters or whatever you want to call them who have returned to Lebanon, in the northern part of it or the Bekaa region, and while the leaders have stayed away, they come in to visit them. Is this correct?

Secretary DAM. It is true that there have been many reports that a number of PLO fighters have returned, particularly to the Bakaa area. We do not have any precise figures. I am sure there have been some, and the number of several hundred is cited in many of the reports.

We also know that there have been occasional visits by lower level leaders. I know of one report of an assassination of one such leader. We believe that this violates the plan, and we have made our position known on that.

Senator PELL. When you say several hundred or so have come back, that is not too significant, but if it is several thousand, it would be very significant. Which do you think it is?

Secretary DAM. Our judgment is that the hundred is more accurate than the thousand. Of course, there were PLO in northern Lebanon who were not part of the evacuation plan, and so I would not put any great significance on their continued presence there. It is a problem, but it is not a problem of reintroduction of the same people who were evacuated.

Senator PELL. Just pressing you a little further on this, would you hazard an estimate as to what percentage of the PLO people who were removed have returned?

Secretary DAM. It would be just a guess, but if you think in terms of several hundred, and there were 7,000 or so who were evacuated, that gives you a percentage falling out of that, but I do not have any independent information on percentages.

Senator PELL. If you get any more specific figures in the coming weeks, I know I for one would be very interested.

Secretary DAM. We certainly will provide you with any concrete information that we obtain.

Senator PELL. How well is the Lebanese Army doing in its efforts to provide security in the Beirut area?

Secretary DAM. It is doing very well in the rather limited area in which it is able to operate now in Beirut. It has been quite vigorous in exercising its internal security functions. We have been working with it in trying to provide equipment and in trying to train the Lebanese Armed Forces, but until the armed forces has an opportunity to extend the reach of its activities, it is a little difficult to form a complete judgment.

Senator PELL. Following up on one of the questions of our chairman, is there any effort being made by the civil authorities in Lebanon to pursue the massacres in the camps to anywhere near the degree that the Israelis have done?

Secretary DAM. Certainly the Israelis have shown every intention of doing a very serious job on this. Their institutions are admirable, and in this case, too, I think that they are undertaking a serious investigation. The Lebanese system is obviously different, and the Lebanese are conducting their investigation in their own way. I have no reason to believe that in the end they will not do an equally serious job. But the procedures are obviously very different.

Senator PELL. Not only very different, but is it because their government is very weak that they are not able to pursue the matter with the vigor that the Israeli Government does, because from the viewpoint of its institutions, they are pretty good?

Secretary DAM. I do not think anything would be served by my forming a judgment about exactly how they are doing this. It is true that the Lebanese Government is a new government. It is operating in a very difficult situation. It is operating in a situation where most of the country is occupied by foreign forces, and where there are the traditional rivalries that we all know about in Lebanon.

And so that must condition the way in which the Lebanese Government proceeds in a number of matters. But they have their own institutions, and in many ways they have been admirably durable institutions. So, I would not criticize them because they do things differently from the way we would do them or from the way the Israelis do them.

Senator PELL. Is there anything you can say in this open meeting concerning the fate of Mr. Dodge, the acting head of the American University of Beirut, who you will remember was kidnapped months ago now? Is he still alive, in your view? Is there any possibility of his being——

Secretary DAM. There is certainly a possibility of him being alive. We are doing everything that we can, and I believe the Lebanese authorities are doing everything they can to try to locate him. I believe that there have been briefings of either members of the committee or staff members as to these efforts, and we would be glad to do that further or supplement it, as the case may be, privately with you.

Senator PELL. But is it your belief that he is still alive?

Secretary DAM. It is my belief that he may still be alive. It is my hope also, and I think it is the hope of everyone that I have talked to about it. We are doing everything we can, because we think it is very important to try to locate him and bring him back safely.

Senator PELL. I was with him in Beirut a few weeks before he was kidnapped, and I share your hope. Of course, I am glad that we are pursuing this.

How much have nations other than our own indicated they will give Lebanon help in the recovery? Are we giving about half, or three-quarters, or one-quarter?

Secretary DAM. In terms of reconstruction funds?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Secretary DAM. First of all, we expect the Lebanese to do a great deal themselves. Let me divide the problem into what private activity in Lebanon can do from what has to be done inevitably by public funds of one kind or another.

There are certain infrastructure investments that have to be made, and then there are other things that can obviously be done by private funds. Obviously, most of the housing reconstruction, reconstruction of office buildings, and so forth, will be done by private funds. There may be a few situations, and I am sure there are, where some private activities nevertheless require some public funds in Lebanon, just like they require public funds in other countries.

But, in general, what we are talking about is infrastructure investment. The Lebanese have already shown great ingenuity and great energy in rebuilding and developing their private sector. So what we are talking about are truly public moneys.

Now, so far as that is concerned, the Lebanese themselves have substantial public resources. They are handicapped by the fact that they have very little customs revenue now, which has been one of the impor-

tant sources of funding. So what we are talking about is a situation in which, just to use very rough figures, we would think that a quarter of the public moneys might come from Lebanon, maybe a half from the Arab world, and a quarter from other countries, of which the United States is one.

We have been interested in the World Bank taking a leadership role with regard to the provision of outside public moneys, if not from all countries, at least from many countries. They have sent a team to Lebanon, and it has done its work, and I understand that it is going to have a report later this month. Then probably there would be some kind of a donors' pledging conference, at the latest, in January.

That is our general approach, and those are the dimensions that we are talking about, but it is rather early to nail down any numbers. Many countries want to wait and see what happens in these negotiations before they make major investments.

Senator PELL. But very roughly, then, it might be a quarter from Lebanon itself, half from the Arab world, and the remaining quarter from outside the Arab world, other nations?

Secretary DAM. Very roughly, that is what we have been thinking of.

Senator PELL. And in connection with that final quarter, would the American contribution be about half, in your view, or a little more, a little less?

Secretary DAM. I would not want to speak to that. The contribution will come in many different forms. Some countries will want to think of their contribution as being the financing of various kinds of capital exports to Lebanon, and we ourselves are interested in what role the Ex-Im Bank might be able to play in that. So you get into the kinds of counting problems that you get into whenever you are talking about foreign aid and respective contributions.

But it is clear that the United States is going to be asked for a contribution that reflects the size of our economy and other factors. I would not say it was disproportionate, but we will be expected to take a lead. I am sure of that.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

The chairman of our committee's Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Secretary, I applaud the high aims that you cite in your statement, the first, second, and third. I hope that those aims can be achieved. The first one is withdrawal forthwith of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and I know that there have been some negotiations. Later on you say that this is going to take three sets of negotiations, negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and between Lebanon and the PLO.

Negotiations have begun between Lebanon and Israel. They hit some snags, which is, I suppose, not unusual. Some of the disagreements have already been compromised; some of them have not, such as the one with respect to Jersusalem. I suppose that they will be compromised.

What about the negotiations with the PLO and the negotiations with Syria? How is Lebanon progressing with them?

Secretary DAM. We have had discussions at high levels with the Syrian Government on a number of occasions with regard to the with-

drawal of the Syrian forces. I know that there have been contacts of various kinds, but not negotiations between Lebanon and Syria on this situation. The Syrians are very clear that they are prepared to withdraw their forces to Syria, but it is also clear that they are not going to do so——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. From Lebanon?

Secretary DAM. From Lebanon, but they are not going to do so if the Israeli forces do not withdraw. I think that there is not going to be any great deal of difficulty with regard to those negotiations, because I do not think that Syria is going to pass up an opportunity to get the Israeli forces out of Lebanon. They recognize that the Israelis are not going to withdraw unless the Syrians do.

So, there is no timetable or anything like that. But we do not have the additional issues in the case of the Syrian negotiations that we have with regard to the Israeli negotiations about normalization. So, that is the situation with regard to Syria.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Therefore, there are three sets of negotiations. Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, they have begun; between Lebanon and Syria, they have not begun, you have just said, but it is a waiting game. When the Israelis go, the Syrians go, and when the Syrians go, the Israelis go, on the other hand.

What about negotiations between Lebanon and the PLO?

Secretary DAM. This may be a semantic problem, but I do not quite accept the premise that negotiations about withdrawal have begun between Lebanon and Israel. That is what we would like to see.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You say that none of these talks have begun.

Secretary DAM. That may be a semantic problem, because there has been a certain amount of shuttling back and forth by Morris Draper and Phil Habib, but the discussions really have had to do with location and that kind of thing. Now, with regard to the PLO, it is somewhat the same situation as Syria, although we are not in a position, given the PLO attitude toward Israel, to have direct discussions with the PLO. We look to the Lebanese to do that.

They have been in touch with the PLO, but there have been no concrete negotiations. I think there are going to be some problems there, but there will not be the kinds of problems that people might foresee. In my judgment, many of the PLO forces are really protected by the Syrian forces, and I do not think they are going to try to stay when the Syrians withdraw.

There will be other forces that are not in that situation, and there will have to be a negotiation about that. I think it is the kind of negotiation that we saw in the case of the evacuation from Beirut, where it would be a question of where are they going to go. We have reason to believe that the PLO are going to want to get out of there, and particularly they are going to want to get out of there if they see that is the way to get the Israelis out of Lebanon.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Will the indigenous Lebanese forces be able to deal with the PLO forces should they remain after the Israelis? I have heard the same thing that you have just said, that when the Syrians withdraw, the PLO may well withdraw. It is hard to predict these things, but would the indigenous Lebanese forces be able to deal with the PLO forces in the event they remained?

Secretary DAM. I think we are talking about the question of whether a few remained. I do not think that Israel is going to want to withdraw their forces if the PLO forces that are there now remain, so we are talking about a somewhat smaller problem than we are talking about now.

The answer to your question, though, to be specific is that this is the reason we are putting so much emphasis on building up the Lebanese armed forces—so they will be able to maintain order and be able to deal with groups of hostile forces of that character that might remain. I think that President Gemayel has shown every intention of being willing to deal with problems of that character if they arise.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Your second goal includes a strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the restoration of the Lebanese Government's sovereignty. Does it now appear to you that within the foreseeable future that the Lebanese Government will be able to exercise sovereignty over the entire country of Lebanon?

Secretary DAM. If we do what we intend to do, and that is to help them build up the Lebanese Armed Forces, I think the answer is yes. Now, there are always internal problems in Lebanon which I wouldn't want to downgrade having to do with the reconciliation of various groups and forces in Lebanon. That is important. That has to go forward.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Your next goal would be establishing a Lebanese national consensus. Senator Pell has talked to you about the reconstruction of the Lebanese economy. Those are very ambitious goals, and I hope that they are achievable. Could you detail for us to the best of your knowledge whether or not the factional fighting has continued to go on and how many deaths there have been since the massacre in the camps? How many deaths continue to occur in Lebanon because of the fighting among the Druze and the other people who seem to continue to shoot at one another?

Secretary DAM. Almost all of the difficulty, all of the violence has been in the Shuf area. There was a situation in the Bekaa, but as I understand it, that involves some foreign forces. With regard to the internal fighting in the Shuf, that has been on again, off again, and I don't have a figure as to the number of deaths. We would deplore any, but I do not think it has been an enormously large number. That has been an area in which the Lebanese Armed Forces have not been in a position to do anything.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. They really have not gone much beyond the greater Beirut area?

Secretary DAM. No, they have not attempted to intrude themselves into the area that is held either by the Syrians or by the Israelis.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I understand that the figure of deaths in the recent weeks in Lebanon has been about 1,200. Is that a fairly accurate figure, in your estimation?

Secretary DAM. I have heard that figure, but not with regard to the fighting in the Shuf. There has been a rumor.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Just in general.

Secretary DAM. There have been rumors of a large number of deaths, but I don't think there's any basis for that. I would be surprised if the fighting in the Shuf or any other area has risen to that level.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Is UNIFIL going to take any part in the multilateral forces? Is there any thought that they will take any part?

Secretary DAM. No. We have thought conceptually of any multilateral force and the UNIFIL force as two entirely different things. The UNIFIL would remain and would have an important role, but it would not function as part of the multilateral force.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Your statement that the President's position regarding the status of the West Bank and Gaza has generated much interest and commentary was an interesting and euphemistic statement. I noted also you said if King Hussein comes to the table, we are confident the Israeli Government will not refuse to negotiate. I think that there has been a long time waiting for King Hussein to come to the table, and the Prime Minister of Israel, prickly though he may be, has stated that he will negotiate without precondition anything with his neighbors.

It is my sincere hope that King Hussein chooses finally to come to the negotiating table. Is there some indication that he may? Is there some greater hope now that he will, that he will get his act together and get to the negotiating table? Or is he going to use as excuses settlements and other matters that really should not stand in the way of negotiating this whole matter?

Secretary DAM. I think that we have grounds to be optimistic. Nobody can promise anything in this situation, obviously. The whole tone of discussion in the Middle East has changed. It wasn't very long ago that the debate was whether or not to have peace with Israel. The question now is how to go about the negotiations to achieve that aim. And that's a big step.

There have been a succession of public statements. I am talking about public statements now by King Hussein which have been more and more forthcoming with regard to his interests and intentions. Of course, he has not taken the final step. It is obvious that there is a desire for, and probably a need for, a good deal of consensus in the Arab world before King Hussein can take that final step up to the table.

He is coming to talk to the President later this month, and I view that as another step in the process. But we are not there, you are right.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I hope one of the steps in the process will not be a consideration of selling him arms without making as a precondition of such a sale the fact that he does enter the negotiating process. In that event I think that there would be little opposition. But otherwise, I am afraid there would be rather broad opposition to such a sale.

Will there be such a precondition in the event that we make an arrangement or make an agreement to sell him additional arms?

Secretary DAM. It is premature to put the question quite that way, at least from the standpoint of a question that I can answer, because at this point we really don't have any formal request from the Jordanian Government. When we get any such request, we will of course then look at it very carefully, consult with this committee, and make up our minds as to what we are going to notify to the Congress and proceed in that way.

So I hear what you are saying, and I appreciate what you are saying, but we just are not quite at that point yet.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I am told that my time is up.

What are we doing to encourage the King to come to the table and participate in the negotiations?

Secretary DAM. First of all, and I think the most important thing, is that we are talking to him and to all of the other countries with which he consults. We are pointing out to them that they have a big stake in peace in the Middle East. They have a big stake in many ways: economic; in terms of their security; and in terms of the overall international geopolitical situation. This is a situation in which we are dealing not with carrots and sticks. We are dealing with the idea of peace. And that's a very powerful idea. I think that this kind of conversation not only with King Hussein but among the Arab countries is what is required in order for that final step to be taken.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is not an idea that has always been in vogue in the Middle East, unfortunately.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz, for some very helpful questions.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. In light of the fact that I came in after President Glenn, I will yield to President Glenn in the hope that he will pick me as——

[Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. I did not yield to Vice President Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. You do so, however, without establishing a precedent.

Senator BIDEN. I want to compliment him on being able to restrain himself from being at the Kennedy press conference. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I do not imagine he was invited.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. If you would yield. Is that an endorsement, Senator Biden, of some sort?

Senator BIDEN. It is close.

Senator GLENN. I have it in writing here.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That is certainly jumping on the bandwagon early.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to see that we are preserving the bipartisan nature of this committee.

Senator BIDEN. It really helped me with Carter.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I would like to tell my friend from Ohio I probably will not endorse him. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. How am I going to ask a serious question after all of this?

Do you have any plans to ask for economic assistance for Lebanon in the continuing resolution that we have to pass before December 17?

Secretary DAM. What we would do when the time is ripe is to think in terms of a supplemental request. The time is just not ripe at this point, given the current situation with regard to the negotiations.

Senator GLENN. Would that be supplemental in the new Congress?

Secretary DAM. Yes.

Senator GLENN. OK. Because I thought if we did not get something in right now, there probably is not going to be any funding available for the first half of next year at least probably, for all practical purposes. And I wonder whether that would not be viewed in Lebanon as a lack of American support.

Secretary DAM. We have done a good deal already with regard to providing funds for Lebanon. About $112 million has been made available, and there is a certain flexibility.

Senator GLENN. You do not see the timeliness of these funds being a real problem?

Secretary DAM. I am informed that that is not a significant problem. Of course, we would expect, if we came forward, to be able to present our case for the supplemental and discuss it with the Congress promptly. But we thought it better to wait until the funds were absolutely needed and until the situation was more concrete.

Senator GLENN. During the first operation in Lebanon, the President announced at the outset that he expected all U.S. forces to be withdrawn within 30 days. No such assurances were given on the second operation. Can you give us any idea of the time? Is this to be in perpetuity? Or is this something we look forward to for many years?

Secretary DAM. Certainly not in perpetuity, certainly not for many years.

Senator GLENN. Short of perpetuity, what is your estimate?

Secretary DAM. Senator Percy and I had a little discussion on that.

Senator GLENN. I heard that. That is the reason I am following up.

Secretary DAM. As I said then, I would be loathe to try to make a precise estimate. Let me say this. The President addressed that question and said—and I do not have his words before me—but essentially, he said that it was for a limited period but that we were not going to set a specific time. And that is really all I can say. I endorse that view of it.

Senator GLENN. Why was a message to us not submitted under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution?

Secretary DAM. Because in our judgment, it was not a situation in which we were introducing U.S. forces under the conditions described by "hostilities" language.

Senator GLENN. Did that not become the case when a marine was killed? We have had a person killed there. We could hardly say that imminent hostilities are not there.

Secretary DAM. I think a fair reading of that language indicates that that was not a situation in which there were hostilities into which we introduced these troops.

Senator GLENN. I am afraid you would have trouble selling that to the family of that marine that was killed. This was not a jeep accident or someone getting hit on the head on a back street someplace. This involved a landmine. That to me is hostilities.

Secretary DAM. I suppose there is room for a difference of opinion. But it was our judgment that we were not introducing these marines into a situation involving hostilities in the way that language is normally used and the way I think it was intended by the Congress.

Senator GLENN. I thought the President would have been on much firmer ground had he submitted that to us under section 4(a)(1), and I did not see any reason why he should not do that. Everyone was aware of the potential hostilities that are there and that are still there. And the 60-day period, the time lease that was on that, ran out on November 28. So we are beyond that time period now.

Beyond the War Powers Act, do you plan to ask for legislative authority from the Congress as you did for our forces in the Sinai?

That was less imminent than Beirut, certainly, and you asked for Congress' authority for the forces in the Sinai if you decide on an extended peacekeeping mission for the Marines in Lebanon.

Secretary DAM. Certainly, if we were in a situation in which we were talking about an indefinite period and a peacekeeping force of that character, then the question of legislation would arise.

In the present situation, we do not have that. Moreover, even in terms of the question of the possibility of an expanded multinational force, what we are talking about is the kind of presence that we see in Beirut, but perhaps extended beyond Beirut.

Senator GLENN. Are you saying then that the Sinai commitment is indefinite?

Secretary DAM. I am not in a position to talk about that. I was not involved in that, and I do not have chapter and verse on exactly what the conditions are. I would be delighted to provide an answer on that.

Senator GLENN. I would appreciate it if you would, because I think the situations are very similar. And I really do not see much difference, except there is much more danger of hostilities in the Beirut area than there is down in the Sinai, of course.

Secretary DAM. We will provide you something on that.

Senator GLENN. Can you tell us what the rules of engagement are for the marines that are there now? What orders are they under? If they are fired upon, are they to fire back? How do they go about their peacekeeping role if there is not a peaceful situation that they run into? Let us say there are riots. Can they come in shooting?

Secretary DAM. The purpose of the multinational force is to provide a presence. There are rules of engagement which the military authorities, the services, have provided. And we could provide information to you on that, or we could provide someone to you from the JCS who could testify to that.

The general notion is that if there is a problem of internal security it is a problem for the Lebanese Armed Forces. We have arrangements to assure that there is constant contact between our forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces so that the Lebanese Armed Forces are immediately available to deal with any——

Senator GLENN. I think it is very important because, let us say there is another tragedy like the Shatita situation and there is a massacre going on in there. Are we authorized to go in to stop something like that with force? We are a peacekeeping force, and we are armed. Now, what do we do with those arms in a situation where it is not a peaceful situation? Are we authorized to enforce the peace?

Secretary DAM. There is a command structure under which the Marines operate, and they take orders from their commanders. But the point is they are not——

Senator GLENN. That is why I asked. What are the rules those commanders are operating under?

Secretary DAM. The force is not intended to be an internal security force. It was very clear. It was made clear to this committee. And we would not intend to move the Marines for the purpose of maintaining order in some other area.

Senator GLENN. At the very least, can you tell me if they are fired upon can they fire back?

Secretary DAM. I would be glad to handle that in one of several ways. Either we could provide something to you in writing on the

exact rules of engagement, or we could provide a representative of the JCS to testify to that. I would be rather reluctant to testify as to a military matter in that situation. The broad mission is very clear, and that is that it is not an internal security mission that the Marines are on.

Senator GLENN. But we are not in a bluff situation. That is my point. It is not like the Sinai, where everyone expected it to be fully peaceful and we would be very surprised if anything broke out in the Sinai. All parties to that agreed, and everybody backed out, and we are there more symbolically than anything else.

Beirut is not that kind of a situation. This is imminent hostile combat, and we cannot get the people out of there. And the Syrians are still there, and we are still having people killed occasionally. We just have not happened to be involved yet.

Now, what are the rules of engagement? That is the question.

Secretary DAM. I addressed that. I will say that there is no question about the fact that the Marines can act in self-defense. But what I understand you to be asking about is whether they can go out and fight a battle. And I am saying that that is not their mission. But again, I would be perfectly happy to provide either a witness from the military or provide a memorandum on the subject.

Senator GLENN. If you could, submit a paper to us on that rather than try to hold another hearing, unless the chairman thinks a hearing is necessary.

But I think this is very important. We put Americans over there, and they are in a hostile situation. The President said nothing is dangerous, or he submitted it under a different paragraph of the War Powers Resolution. Yet we have had one man killed already.

And I think we should know, Mr. Chairman, exactly what these are before we get—what if something happens one of these days and we have 50 killed? Now, is that still not imminent hostilities? I do not know how you judge these things.

To me it was imminent when we put our people in there in the situation they were going into. And I would like a better definition of it, and whatever you could provide us on that I think we would like to include in the record.

Secretary DAM. I would be very happy to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glenn, you might not have been here when I asked the question as to whether or not the President would, should it appear as though we would become involved in a situation of actual or clearly imminent hostilities, be prepared to report that fact to Congress? And we had an affirmative answer from the Acting Secretary.

Senator GLENN. Can you tell me, are the Marines getting combat pay?

Secretary DAM. No; they are not.

Senator GLENN. Why are we not using the U.N. troops there? I do not understand that. I know that you addressed that a little while ago. We have 7,000 UNIFIL troops there, and I know nobody trusts their combat capability much, but 7,000 troops, and we are not even using them in any way, shape, or form. I guess they are still sitting down there where they were bypassed when the Israelis went north. Is that right?

Secretary DAM. That is exactly right.

Senator GLENN. Why are we not using the 7,000 troops that are there now? Why are we not integrating them in there and getting them as an effective force so we can get our people out?

Secretary DAM. I do not think that they are going to be able to function under the existing U.N. mandate until there is a withdrawal of the foreign forces. Their mandate, and the only basis upon which they can act under their security council mandate, is in the general area of southern Lebanon. At the present time, that is occupied territory. Now, that is a sufficient reason for not using in Beirut the 7,000 UNIFIL troops.

Beyond that, there is the point that they do not have the confidence of the Israeli Government. Therefore it would probably not provide the kind of presence that is necessary for the confidence of the respective sides for separation, say, of the Syrian and the Israeli forces.

Senator GLENN. My time is up, but there is a difference here between combat pay and the hostile fire pay. There is some technical difference here, as I understand it. Are the Marines there getting hostile fire pay?

Secretary DAM. My understanding is that they are not, and I am quite confident that they are not receiving any kind of pay that implies hostilities.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Glenn. I think the question you have raised is a very valid question. We will pursue it.

I commented, I believe, to the Acting Secretary before that when I spoke to the Marines there, and asked them what they felt, having been on the ground for a while, the most imminent danger was—one of them turned to me and said, Senator, it is the rats at night in those buildings that we have to sleep in. They jump on their chests, apparently, and at that particular point that was their main concern.

We certainly will watch this very carefully, and should there be certainly any extended period of time, we would want to work out what kind of authorization there should be then.

Secretary DAM. I would like to say in this respect, and I realize this is not an answer to Senator Glenn, but from the standpoint of the people who are listening here, and who may have forgotten the circumstances, the death of the marine that he is talking about was the death associated with the clearing of mines, and it was an accidental situation.

There is an investigation going on as to what the cause and effect was of the mine exploding. That is something that is being investigated, and I just wanted to make sure that everybody understood what it was we were having our dialog about.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to pursue this a little further, and I understand your reluctance to speak to the operating orders of the military on the ground, but obviously the judgment that this did not fall within the purview of the War Powers Act, the stationing of troops in the manner in which it has been done, is a judgment not made by JCS or not made by the military but by you at the State

Department and, I assume, with the Justice Department giving a reading also.

And so, what I would like to pursue, and the reason I would like to pursue this question is not merely as it relates to the present situation, but as to what precedent may be set for other situations in other parts of the world, so I want to make sure I understand the State Department's reading of the War Powers Act, rather than the JCS's reading, or the military reading of the War Powers Act.

Now, let me make sure. Are these marines getting the same pay that they would get if they were back at Camp LeJeune?

Secretary DAM. First of all, it is not our view that this is not covered by the War Powers Act. What we are talking about is a particular provision in the War Powers Act.

Senator BIDEN. Relating to hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities. Thanks for correcting me. Yes, that is a very important correction.

Secretary DAM. It may be that they are receiving certain kinds of pay with regard to the fact that they are not in the United States, but they are not getting any kind of pay which implies that they are engaged in hostilities or about to be engaged in hostilities.

Senator BIDEN. Can you check for us whether or not they are receiving any pay different than if they were stationed in Germany?

Secretary DAM. We certainly can do that, yes. It may be that there are certain kinds of so-called hardship pay which has to do with location and the fact that they are not living in barracks and so forth.

Senator BIDEN. Fine. That would be helpful for me, at least.

[The information referred to follows:]

Deputy Secretary Dam was asked during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 1, 1982, if U.S. forces in Beirut were receiving any kind of special pay because of their duty as part of the MNF. We have verified that the members of the U.S. Armed Forces currently serving in the MNF in Lebanon are only getting the normal pay and allowances that they receive while on sea duty or when assigned to foreign posts. Married members also get a family separation allowance. They do not receive combat pay, hostile fire pay or any other special financial compensation for serving in the MNF in Lebanon.

Senator BIDEN. Now, regarding the situation that Senator Glenn made reference to, if there was another massacre situation where Christians or anyone else went into an area that was made up of Palestinian refugees, or into some of the Christian area of Lebanon, Beirut in particular, what do you think the reaction would be if the United States troops were anywhere in proximity to such an occurrence and did nothing, stood by, did not authorize anybody moving in or out of a sector, but were within, figuratively speaking, earshot?

There is no plausible denial that they knew what was going on. We are not devoid of our intelligence sources in Lebanon now. It is not likely that a similar circumstance that occurred 3 months ago would occur without U.S. forces in Beirut having some knowledge that there is serious commotion.

I assume you are saying that we wouldn't initiate action to go in to either investigate or stop, and if that is the case, then my question is, what happens to the United States if, in fact, an occurrence similar to that went on and we did not take action? I am sure you have

thought of these things, but can you go through with us how you think it will or should be handled?

Secretary DAM. You are posing a very difficult problem, and one that obviously we hope will never arise.

Senator BIDEN. But would you not acknowledge that it is not a far-fetched problem? It is in the history of Lebanon of the last 8 years. It is almost a probability that somewhere, not necessarily in the U.S. sector, but somewhere in Lebanon something like that is going to go on again.

Secretary DAM. Oh, yes. I thought we were talking about a massacre in a Palestinian camp.

Senator BIDEN. But it could be a massacre in a Christian sector of Lebanon where a group of 200 Palestinians who are already in the Bekaa Valley infiltrate themselves into Beirut, and make it in, and begin to blow away a sector of the city in a kamakaze mission. That would not be unusual.

Secretary DAM. Let me explain our general approach to the problem. You are posing a good law school hypothetical about a concrete situation, which obviously makes me very nervous, because it is a very hard case. In law school they say that hard cases make bad law, and I think that we ought to ask ourselves how we prevent that kind of situation from arising.

The way we prevent that kind of situation from arising is making sure that the Lebanese Government is in a position to deal with those kinds of situations and that its police and armed forces are in a position to deal with that kind of problem.

That requires that we provide the kind of presence that will permit the foreign forces, which are cheek by jowl there, to separate and withdraw from Lebanon, and that we do everything we can to build up the Lebanese Army. I am sure that part of the negotiations, if we can ever get them started, will have to do with assuring that there will be protection for Palestinian civilians in Lebanon.

We know that the PLO is going to put that right at the top of their list of concerns. There is going to have to be provision made for that. So that, it seems to me, is the large picture with regard to the situation.

Now, I do not want to dodge your question. I am going to come to it. But I wanted to put things in perspective.

Senator BIDEN. Let me pursue your general answer with a general question, to make sure I understand. First of all, the immediate rationale for the presence of American troops in Beirut now is to provide a backdrop in which forces can withdraw with some sense of not having to give up too much or jeopardize their interest as they perceive it, and to give time for the Lebanese Army to build up its physical capability of keeping the peace.

There are two principal purposes, with which I do not disagree, and I doubt that anyone on this committee disagrees. But as I see it, and I stand to be corrected, the Lebanese Army at this very moment, this very day, is not in the position that we hope it will be in to be able to keep the peace, and is not likely to be in the next couple of days, couple of weeks, or couple of months.

And second, all the forces that we hope are going to withdraw are in fact not withdrawn, and we hope that will occur, but none of us, I believe, in this room believe it is likely to occur in the next couple of

days or couple of weeks. Hopefully, within a couple of months, but it is not likely.

I think we would all be overwhelmingly surprised and pleased if by Christmas this was resolved. I mean, it would be a Christmas gift that no one that I know anticipates.

Consequently, since the two purposes for which we are there, two of the major purposes for which we are there are not likely to be fulfilled in the next several weeks to months, it puts us in a very difficult position, and that is that no one can keep the peace, and the prospects of hostilities are still significant, if not imminent, significant.

And consequently, how we are going to react within this limbo period has a significant impact upon our world standing and our credibility in the Middle East particularly.

Now, I am going to say something very presumptuous, which is to suggest that I disagree with the experts on this side of the bench and on that side about—for example, our staff memo says just what you said. Our staff memo says that with regard to the PLO forces that have been reinfiltrated into the Bekaa Valley, they are not likely to remain, absent Syrian protection. That is sort of the gospel now. That is conventional wisdom.

Well, if I were Yesser Arafat, what I would like to see happen is, I would like very much for the Israelis to be forced into the Bekaa Valley. I would love the Israelis to have to make, even if it cost me dearly, love to make them do another thing that would cost them more in terms of world public opinion. I would love to see the Israelis make a major move into the Bekaa Valley, have a major conflict wth the Syrians, or even with me, even come in and blow away 200 of my crack troops, kill them all.

We are talking about leadership that is not really adverse to terrorism. They are hard-baked, tough fellows. So I do not see them moving as much as you all do, even without the Syrians there.

Second, I would think that it would be a great political move, and that is what the PLO's entire existence for the past 10 years has been. Their military acts have been more politically motivated than militarily motivated. They never thought they could defeat Israel. I would like very much to see my 200 PLO fighters infiltrate themselves into Beirut, and blow away an entire sector of the Christian community, anywhere, just pick any 200, 300, 500, and blow them away within earshot of the American forces, and either force the Americans to come in and take on my people or have the Americans stand by.

Now, that is what worries me a great deal. Since everyone is so certain that is not going to happen, that makes me feel a little better, but because I do not see that as something that is unlikely, or some version of those two scenarios, I wonder—I worry a lot about how we are going to justify American presence after an occurrence like that, and I also am worried that there is no real way in which you can justify American presence for the purposes for which we state that they are there without acknowledging that danger is imminent and hostilities exist.

If hostilities did not exist, the Lebanese Army would not need the time. If danger was not imminent, we would not have to be there to provide for and be the buffer for the forces that are in place. Almost

when we set out why we are there, it seems to me we acknowledge that there is hostility and there is imminent danger.

And so I would think it would be much wiser for the administration to suggest this operated under the War Powers Act and the provision specifically that you and I disagree on—you say it does not, and I say it does—because I suspect that Congress as a whole would give you the authority you wanted, and then we would in fact be out of the limbo stage and into a position where we all knew what we were talking about, and U.S. forces and authority was clear as it related to at least what the mandate from the United States was to those troops.

That is more of a statement than a question, obviously, but I wanted you to know why I am pursuing this, not because I disagree with your objective, and not because if it were submitted under the War Powers Act I would vote against it. If you would like to comment on any of that, please do. If not, that is fine.

Secretary DAM. I have no comment on what you said except that there were just two things, not really in response or in contradiction to what you are saying, but I think we might bear in mind.

First of all, with regard to where the Marines are right now, we are talking about the city of Beirut, and there is not much doubt that the Lebanese Armed Forces have the capability of maintaining the peace in Beirut. In fact, they have been rather vigorous—some people would argue too vigorous—in making sure that it remains a safe place. There is no PLO reinfiltration.

I would just emphasize that this is the situation which currently exists. If there is an expansion or change in the role for the multinational force, then we will of course consult with this committee. If it is of a sufficient character to bring into play the hostilities language, we would then file under the hostilities language. In any event, we would file another report if we were changing, say, by a great expansion in the number of troops.

Just by way of putting things in perspective, I would note that there is another part of the War Powers Act which refers to introducing into the territory of a foreign government troops equipped for combat.

Now, we have filed a general report, saying that we do not believe that the language of section 4(a)(1), which is the language you are talking about, applies. We are not saying that we have not introduced troops equipped for combat. Congress must have assumed, however, that they were not on an R&R visit if they were going to be equipped for combat when they were sent some place.

So, obviously, the War Powers Resolution involves a gradation of situations, and all we are saying is simply that given that 50–50 situation, we do not think we are on the hostilities side of the line.

Senator BIDEN. With the permission of the chairman and Senator Dodd, one last question, and I have gone way over my time.

If in fact these American Marines were to be moved from their position in Beriut to the Bekaa Valley, would you not acknowledge under that circumstance they would fall within the provisions of the War Powers Act you and I are debating here this morning?

Secretary DAM. In the situation in which they were——

Senator BIDEN. Today.

Secretary DAM. Certainly, because there are PLO and Syrian forces there, and they would not be able to move there without hostilities in

all likelihood. So, given that hypothetical, yes. I am not saying, however, that if all the foreign forces withdrew——

Senator BIDEN. I understand. My question related to this very moment. I just wanted to get the parameters.

Senator PELL [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

The Senator from Connecticut.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me pursue the same general thrust of questioning, but stepping back a little bit. In your statement this morning, and it may be just my reading of it, you say, "A critical test for American diplomacy is in Lebanon. Our objective is straightforward. We seek to restore Lebanese sovereignty and to assure Israeli security."

"We seek to restore Lebanese sovereignty." Given the fact that there are so many factions there, some 13 Christian factions, three or four Moslem factions, given so many divergent groups and historic hostilities between them, it was a miracle in fact that it had lasted as long as it had. Much of the problem in Lebanon, while certainly it has been exacerbated by PLO and Syrian involvement over the past 7 or 8 years, was the result of the inability of various factions of the Lebanese society to get along with one another.

That contributed. Would you agree with that?

Secretary DAM. I think that on one scale the Lebanese society and the government structure has been remarkably resilient. It seems to me that they have had a foreign force, certainly the PLO, in their territory for quite a long time now, going back to 1970, when the PLO moved from Jordan. And I agree that it is a country with uncommon problems, but I am not sure that I would agree that it is not at least as stable as many countries in the world.

Senator DODD. What I am trying to get at is, to what extent do you attribute the difficulties in resolving the Lebanese sovereignty question to the divergent internal political and religious factions in Lebanon? Is that a major political or potentially military problem, or is it a minor one?

Secretary DAM. It is the condition we are facing. I agree it is part of the problem. It is one of the reasons why it is so important in our view to support the new Lebanese Government, because without it we are not going to be able to deal with these problems.

That is one of the reasons we are concerned about some demands that might be made on the Lebanese Government by other governments at this time?

Senator DODD. Well, we are drifting a little. All I am trying to establish with you is that the problem in Lebanon, while it is a Syrian and potentially a PLO problem with the Lebanese, there is also an internal Lebanese conflict. Do you accept that?

Secretary DAM. I accept that. But I am having difficulty with the notion——

Senator DODD. So there is a level of hostility that has existed internally in Lebanon, apart from and aside from the external threat posed by forces; is that not correct?

Secretary DAM. Certainly. I was just thinking about your request that I put it in the major or the minor box. That is why I say, you are

obviously right, it is a condition under which we have to view the full question of the multinational force, the withdrawal of foreign forces, et cetera.

Senator DODD. So when we get back to the questions raised by Senator Glenn and Senator Percy and others, we are talking about a potential level of hostility and we must also include as a potential source of that hostility the internal Lebanese elements which pose that problem as well, is that not correct?

Secretary DAM. Surely, that would be correct.

Senator DODD. So we now have a request to increase and double the size of our peacekeeping force, from 1,200 to 2,400. What circumstances have arisen in the past week or 2, however long it has been since that decision was made, which would warrant the doubling of the size of the U.S. peacekeeping force, if in fact there is not a greater danger of hostility, be it of internal or external origin?

Secretary DAM. Somehow or other I am not on the same wavelength with you. There has been a decision to double the size of the multinational force?

Senator DODD. It was reported this morning that that was the case. Is that untrue?

Secretary DAM. That the U.S. Government has decided to?

Senator DODD. The decision was made to go from 1,200, I think, to 2,400.

Secretary DAM. I understand that the news story had to do with a request that the Lebanese Government had made, and that request is in the context——

Senator DODD. And we had agreed?

Secretary DAM. No, we absolutely have not agreed with the Lebanese Government to do that. That is untrue. We have talked to them and we have been talking to other countries. And I say in my testimony very straightforwardly that it may be necessary to have an expanded multinational force.

The circumstances under which it would be necessary to have such an expanded multinational force is some progress on the negotiations with regard to withdrawal, so that as the forces withdraw we would be able to extend the presence of the American troops.

Senator DODD. Let me make sure of this. I am not going to try to—press accounts can drive us all crazy. There was a request made, is that correct, to double our involvement?

Secretary DAM. There was a request. First of all, there had been discussions at many levels. There was something that can be called a request made to the coordinating committee of the multinational force; commanders and other people associated with forces in Lebanon.

Senator DODD. Of U.S. forces?

Secretary DAM. Yes, and of——

Senator DODD. How large was that request? What was the size of the request they made?

Secretary DAM. First of all, it is not a document. It was a statement, as I understand it, made at a meeting. My understanding is in accord with yours, that they are talking about something like a doubling. But I do not have anything specific, because again it is not a piece of paper.

Senator DODD. And we have rejected that request?

Secretary DAM. We have neither accepted nor rejected. We do not think it is a question of whether to accept it or reject it. The decision to accept or reject cannot be made in the absence of something happening on the negotiations, because the whole basis for an expansion of the multinational force since such expansion is not needed in the city of Beirut, would be that there would be some place where those forces can be deployed.

Now, there is no place that they can be deployed so long as the conflicting forces are standing opposite each other. So there is no place for them to be deployed.

Senator DODD. What was the justification that the committee or whatever it was that made the request—what did they argue as the rationale for doubling the size of U.S. military involvement?

Secretary DAM. It was the Lebanese Government making it to the coordinating committee. I think it is in the context of making progress on the negotiations, and I think that it is a situation in which everyone is feeling everyone out as to exactly how this whole set of activities, the withdrawal and so forth, might occur.

We have already had a public statement, as I understand it, by the French Government that they would be interested in expansion of their forces, and there have been discussions by other countries of possible interest.

Senator DODD. The French have reached a conclusion that they think it is wise to increase the size of their force?

Secretary DAM. When President Gemayel visited France, there was a statement. We would have to check on this, but it is my understanding that there was some forthcoming public statement along the lines that the French would be prepared to do more. This was a month or 6 weeks ago.

Senator DODD. Anything new on that at all?

Secretary DAM. Nothing public, to my knowledge. The French continue to be very interested in the situation, as do the Italians, as do we. We are all very anxious to see the withdrawal of foreign forces. And we recognize that it may well be necessary to have an expansion of the multinational force when that occurs. We hope it occurs soon, but——

Senator DODD. I do not want to sound terribly naive, but if things are relatively peaceful and we have no reason to be concerned about the possibility of hostilities, what circumstances or events are occurring that would cause the French to consider increasing the size of their forces, that would cause the Lebanese Government to request an increase in the size of the U.S. troop involvement?

What is it that is occurring that requires 2,400, assuming we doubled our size, or whatever the total number may be? What is it that is occurring that the present level of forces could not do that would require a larger level of forces to do, if in fact the withdrawal of those troops, foreign forces, is going to occur?

Secretary DAM. What the conversation has been about is to create a situation in which the Syrians and the Israeli forces have the confidence to withdraw from positions in which they are facing each other with arms loaded. There might be, for example, a deployment along the highway leading out of Beirut in the direction of Damascus. That presumably might require additional troops.

It is not because there are any more hostilities. It is not because there would be hostilities. The whole theory thus far has been that this presence is the trigger for providing the confidence that brings about withdrawal. That was the situation before and it proved to be very useful.

It could well prove to be very useful again, and that really has nothing to do with the level of hostilities. It has to do with the negotiations and the ensuing withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of Lebanon.

Senator DODD. My time has expired, but I did not get to my last point with you, which brings us up to this question that has been raised now by everyone here. And I do not want to be redundant, but there are so many unanswered questions, and I certainly appreciate your presence here this morning to help clear up some of this.

I would support what Senator Biden has said, so I do not want you to assume that because I raise questions in the tone that I have that I would necessarily vote against some of the suggestions that are being made. But I do think it is a precarious path indeed that we are following, to have merely consultations and not some more direct congressional involvement.

It seems we are talking about semantic differences between hostile zones and nonhostile zones. I think we are playing with words rather than realities. And my concern is, while we have been, knock on wood, in no trouble so far with U.S. forces, lives being jeopardized, that could dramatically change in 5 minutes. And the fact that we have not had more consultation, more involvement at the legislative level, I think is a matter of deep concern and I would hope that we might go beyond what we presently have as a way of involving congressional support for these activities.

I will come back to that if I can, Mr. Chairman. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I just have one additional question to put to you. Before I do that I would like to just mention the appreciation of the committee on your first day as Acting Secretary spending this time with us. You could have easily found an excuse to have Nick Veliotes come up. We are always happy to see him, but I think it is a very fine thing that you came. I want the committee members to know—and I say right now what I have said in secret session—in 16 years I have never seen anyone come into a top post in the U.S. Government in the executive branch and assume command in as fine a way as you have.

This view is shared in the State Department. You are the alter ego of the Secretary. There could not have been a closer working relationship established between you and Secretary Shultz, because you have worked together for so long. And I think it is a sense of confidence that the world can have, our allies can have, and the Americans can have, that the State Department is functioning in an efficient way today. The Department's influence has increased immensely in just these past few months, and I think the working relationships that have been established and the confidence that you have right here in this committee is extremely important.

If Senator Kassebaum were here she would want to second my comments and observations, and I think they have been made by other committee members. Senator Pell has evidenced his strong feelings that we have fine management in the State Department, we have great

confidence in it, and our working relationship has been extraordinarily good.

I know you had long hours as Provost at the University of Chicago, but Mrs. Dam is here, and I am saying this really because most of our wives do not see us very much when we are in session and when we are working long hours and weekends. So there never seems to be an end to work. I thought I used to work hard in business, but I never saw the kind of hours that people put in in Washington.

We very much appreciate your appearance here. I will submit for the record additional questions that will complete this record for Senators that could not be here and save your time and so that you can get back and run the show over there.

Senator Pell will have a few questions. I would like to reinforce my own feeling that we should work out now what kind of a congressional authority for sending our troops to Lebanon should exist. I am sympathetic with Senator Glenn and the other members of the committee.

Senator Pell and I sent a letter to the President on this matter. We support the concept of having U.S. forces being part of the peacekeeping process in Lebanon. They are absolutely crucial and essential. But the law is now constructed that we are approaching the point where we should share responsibility, and we want to share it and will be willing to share that.

I think it would have overwhelming support from the Congress, but there should be some congressional authorization if we have an extended Lebanese peacekeeping force, even if it does not require separate funding, as the MFO required. That required separate funding. Our forces in Lebanon may not require separate funding. But I would think we would try to work out some specific authorization, and we want to work in company with you on that.

My question relates to an incident that you may not have heard of. I did not hear about it until a few minutes ago. I had dinner with Walid Jumblatt when he was here. He is the 33-year-old leader of the Lebanese 200,000 Druze Muslims. He is the acknowledged leader of that Muslim group. A car bomb exploded in West Beirut today and 4 people were killed and 38 others were wounded. Among the dead were a Lebanese peace officer and Jumblatt's bodyguard. The Christian-owned Voice of Lebanon Radio said the blast was near the Haigazian Armenian College and was aimed at Jumblatt, who is the leader of the Muslim militia alliance known as the National Movement.

Now, with these kinds of incidents occurring it certainly shows that there is not a stabilized political situation in Lebanon. Would this instability indicate that we should try to work out something that would assure the Congress that it has assumed a degree of responsibility for the continued presence of American forces if they are going to be there for an extended period?

Secretary DAM. Mr. Chairman, we would be delighted to sit down with you and discuss that question, or with individual members of the committee. I do think these incidents are internecine warfare, obviously, although I am not able to speak to this particular situation since it just happened and we will have to learn more about it.

But I think it is also important to understand that we are in a fluid situation in which the question of expansion of the MNF and how

long it might be there and so forth turn very much on negotiations or lack thereof, where the conditions seem to change from day to day. So this will have to be a continuing discussion that we would have about congressional involvement

In the meantime, we are willing and anxious to talk with you, brief you, brief your staffs, on whatever basis you would like. And the reason we need to talk about it is that it is important not to get into an inflexible situation where there is no opportunity to respond to the fluid negotiating situation.

So I think it would be useful for us to sit down and discuss this on a regular basis.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. And on balance, with regard to the peace process in the Middle East, I am consciously optimistic that we are on—I know we are on the right track. There is not any question about that. There is not any power on Earth that can do as much as the United States, as your testimony has pointed out. There is no question about that.

It is a very high priority for this administration. We know that. And certainly I was encouraged by the progress that seems to be taking place now in Jordan. We are looking forward very much to the visit of King Hussein and the subsequent visit of Prime Minister Begin, of course.

I want to thank you very much indeed.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, is there any possibility of an Israeli freeze on the settlement policy in the West Bank? Do you see any movement in that direction?

Secretary DAM. I do not see any manifestation of an intention by the Israeli Government to freeze the settlements, no.

Senator PELL. I think you are correct and I regret so.

Do you think that President Reagan will get personally involved in the overall negotiations, somewhat the way President Carter did before, where if it had not been for Carter's presence at Camp David we would not have had Camp David? And it seems to me we are almost in a period of this sort now, where the President may have to get personally involved. Do you see that possibly happening?

Secretary DAM. The President has been personally involved in dealing with and in speaking to important leaders. He was personally involved in the negotiations with the Arab League delegation. He will be personally involved in talking to King Hussein. We expect a visit, though it has not been definitely arranged, from Prime Minister Begin. Moreover, there have been letters and other messages.

But the use of the Camp David mechanism, is another matter entirely. It worked very well in a particular time in history. It led to a framework which envisions the kind of negotiations that we would like to see occur, and those necessarily have to be technical negotiations.

So I do not see a role for the President personally and directly in the actual negotiations with regard to the West Bank and Gaza. I do see a role for him in discussing with the leaders of the Middle East their participation at the negotiating table, and I think it is a role that he has assumed and is active in.

Senator PELL. Do you presume that Lebanon and the Middle East problem are one and the same, or do you see an effort made to separate out the Lebanon problem from the overall problem?

Secretary DAM. We see them, as I said in the testimony, as separate problems, in the sense that it is important to be working on the Lebanon problem without regard to the other and it is important to be working on the broader Middle East peace process even when we see stumbling blocks and hesitancy on the Lebanon problem.

No one can deny that they are closely related. First of all, they are related in the minds of the people involved in the Middle East, the leaders in the Middle East. And so it is a curious situation in which it is important to see that there is a difference, but at the same time we have to be very conscious of the interrelationship and its impact on the countries involved.

Senator PELL. Now, going to a more specific area, southern Lebanon. And here I would like to acknowledge in the audience the presence of Mrs. Mala Shalabi, who has taken a leading role as head of the International Committee for the Safeguarding of Tyre, and her father, who has been a deputy for 30 years and still is from Tyre, and Mrs. Carol Taylor, who is also active in the movement, Safeguarding of Tyre.

Tyre, as you know, has some of the most remarkable archeological ruins in the world, unexplored. The invasion by the Israelis has resulted in many of the houses being leveled that were there before. When it comes to reconstruction of these houses, it would be obviously better if they were reconstructed away from being on top of the archeological ruins.

I was wondering if any thought had been given in the reconstruction efforts to reconstructing Tyre not right on top of what is really a gold mine from an archeological viewpoint?

Secretary DAM. I am personally not familiar with the particular situation on the ground there. I am glad to know about this problem. I will certainly inform myself on it, and meanwhile I am sure that we have people who are very concerned. Peter McPherson has made a number of trips to Lebanon, and he has been out of Beirut and I am sure that he would—he is the Administrator of the AID and he is the person who——

Senator PELL. Who?

Secretary DAM. Peter McPherson, who is Administrator of AID, has assumed within the U.S. Government responsibility for Lebanese reconstruction. He is not here today, but I am sure that he would be familiar with this problem. And we would certainly look into that, because there are undoubtedly many factors involved, human problems and so forth.

But we believe also that the preservation of archeological ruins is very important to the preservation of the culture of the Middle East, and so that would be an important objective.

Senator PELL. I would be grateful if you followed that up. Now, a final question. What is the future of the 50- or 40-kilometer zone in southern Lebanon that the Israelis feel is so necessary to their security? Do you see that zone being established so that Israel's security will be safeguarded?

Secretary DAM. I am not quite sure exactly what you are asking. We see as reasonable the request for a security zone.

Senator PELL. As you know, the Israelis feel there must be a secure zone on their border.

Secretary DAM. Right.

Senator PELL. And if Lebanon reacquires, or when it is once more an independent nation without foreign troops, how will that security be assured?

Secretary DAM. Lebanon understands the Israeli request for a security zone, and I do not think there is going to be any difficulty about negotiating it. There is also the question of the role of other forces within the security zone and Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL forces. And I see a role for both. I do not know that there is serious Israeli disagreement with that except insofar as they have a well-known dislike for the UNIFIL concept.

It seems to me UNIFIL has an important role, and they are very active even right now under the situation where there are Israeli forces there. All of that has to be negotiated out. And I am sure that there will be specific issues that will arise.

There are also questions about the role of other forces that are in that zone now and what would happen to them. All of that has to be negotiated. I do not think this is a major stumbling block in the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations.

The stumbling blocks thus far have had to do with the question of the level and location of the talks. All of that is related to this other set of issues having to do with normalization. I think that this is where the difficulties in these negotiations will arise rather than with regard to the security zone.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very briefly, first of all, let me also compliment you on stepping into certainly the most complicated and difficult foreign policy area I can think of anywhere around the globe. And the complexity of these problems almost defies solution it seems from time to time. So I respect, first of all, your willingness to grapple with these problems.

What I was driving at, and what I think some of the other members of the committee were, on the question of our U.S. peacekeeping force—and I would ask you to comment on this when I finish, and this will be the only point I want to make—is that there seems to be such vagueness about our role, the size, the territory we are going to be covering, how long we are going to be there.

It seems to me such an open-ended proposition. That concerns a very diverse group of people here on Capitol Hill. We have foreign forces—French, Italian, and U.S. forces—going in to try to secure the removal of foreign forces, PLO, Syrian, and Israeli forces. It has what someone has described as almost an Alice-in-Wonderland kind of an approach in dealing with the problem.

I am not suggesting it is not necessary, but it seems to me that we are potentially getting ourselves into a situation that will even further complicate our role in dealing with the issue of peace in the Middle East. People such as Congressman John Murtha from Pennsylvania, who was recently there, a Vietnam veteran combat officer, expressed

deep reservations and concerns about the presence of U.S. Marines there over an extended period of time.

So it is not just a question for those who are concerned about it from a particular viewpoint, it seems to raise concerns among a broad cross section of people on the Hill.

The vagueness of time, involvement, territory, size, all these open-ended questions, if we do not tighten it down and have a much clearer viewpoint of exactly where we are going, then I can see real, real problems, further problems in an already highly complicated situation emerging.

And I would ask you whether or not you think that criticism is legitimate and what in fact you think the administration might do to help clear up what I think is a very legitimate question.

Secretary DAM. Actually, I do not really accept it in the sense as criticism, because it is our concern, too. That is why we are reluctant to be drawn into a statement of what the Marines will do in a situation which we cannot yet envision, a situation that will not become ripe until the negotiations have progressed.

Right now, the Marines are sitting tight in Beirut. Some people would say we are too cautious, but we are not going to make commitments as to exactly what the Marines will do in a situation which has not come to rest.

The only thing, as I said in my statement, that it is premature to discuss the nature of an expanded force or a force that extends beyond Beirut except in the most general terms because it all depends on what the Israelis and the Lebanese, or the Syrians and the Lebanese, or the PLO and the Lebanese are able to agree on.

I think you would have greater grounds for criticism if we were to say, well, it is going to be X, Y, and Z when we really do not know what the situation is going to be like a month, 2 months from now.

But the questions you are raising will remain questions with regard to any proposed expansion or changed disposition of those forces if we are successful in achieving the withdrawal of the foreign forces. And we certainly will be here trying to answer those questions because we too are concerned about the uncertainties there.

That said, and I think that this was implied in many of the questions today, despite the uncertainty, difficulties and potential dangers, there is also an important role for the United States to play. A great deal is at stake with regard to peace in the Middle East and the security of Israel in the resolution of the Lebanon problem. Without a reconciled political situation in Lebanon, without the removal of foreign forces, which is really a prerequisite to that, and without a Lebanon that has sovereignty over its territory, able to deal with reinfiltration, with political strife, and the like, Lebanon could remain a place where you could see again the reintroduction of foreign forces that would be a threat to Israel.

So we see it as part of our general Middle East policy in that respect, separate but related. These uncertainties and these difficulties highlight the importance of American leadership and willingness to take steps to bring about a resolution. It is a difficult situation. I accept the points that you are making in that regard.

Senator DODD. I appreciate your response. And let me just add that I appreciate the individual consultation. We have certainly had it,

whether it has been from Nick Veliotes, or Mr. Moore, or others, when we have requested it. I think there ought to be a more formal and broader kind of relationship between the Congress and the administration on this particular issue as we sort of work our way through it. I think it makes a lot more sense to have that from the beginning.

Mere consultation, while it is appreciated, I do not think really lets us get to the heart of these problems and the potential difficulties. So I appreciate what you are saying, but I would urge the administration to consider seriously on its own initiative asking for congressional support more than in just a consultative function in the future on these issues. And I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

For the benefit of my colleagues, I would like to say that Secretary Shultz, as we know, will be traveling a great deal for the next 2 months. And before leaving, he made it very clear to me that he does not intend, in typical George Shultz style, to carry the day-by-day operating portfolio of the State Department with him when he is traveling. Full authority has been left with Secretary Dam, and for that reason we doubly appreciate your being with us today.

In the concluding comment that you made, you mentioned the problem of Israel's relations with Egypt and the fact that various elements of the border peace process must be put on a firm foundation. I would like to add my voice to that. I have been extremely disturbed by the ragged relationship that has existed recently. They have so much to gain by repairing that as rapidly as possible and implementing the unfinished business in the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

We certainly will support your efforts to attain that goal. Both are our friends and allies, and I hope that they can resolve some of those unsolved problems.

Thank you very much. There being no further business, the meeting is adjourned.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

STATE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. What is the status of the GOL inquiry into the Sabra and Shatila massacre?

Answer. The official Lebanese inquiry into the massacre has not concluded its deliberations, which are being conducted in secret.

Question 2. How true is the report that there are many PLO fighters who have returned to Lebanon?

Answer. We have no evidence that large numbers of PLO personnel have returned to Lebanon. We cannot rule out, however, that some have returned to rejoin units that remained in the country or to rejoin family members who are still in Lebanon.

Question 3. Can you tell us what the rules of engagement are for the Marines operating in the MNF contingent in Lebanon?

Answer. The September 25 exchange of notes between the Governments of the United States and Lebanon, which governs the participation of U.S. forces in the current Multinational Force (MNF), provides that "the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense." Accordingly, U.S. forces in the Beirut area are instructed to refrain from using force except in their own defense (or the defense of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) personnel assigned to accompany them).

However, U.S. military personnel would certainly not stand idly by if they were to observe acts of violence against innocent noncombatants. They would imme-

diately call upon the appropriate LAF authorities, who have responsibility for maintaining order in such circumstances, to respond at once to stop the violence and apprehend those involved; to facilitate this, LAF liaison personnel are assigned to accompany U.S. forces in their operations in the Beirut area. If necessary this request for LAF action would be reinforced in the Liaison and Coordinating Council which includes high-level GOL representatives and the three MNF representatives and the three MNF commanders.

If, in the event that LAF personnel were not available to respond, and there were an imminent threat to innocent life, U.S. military personnel on the scene would be expected to take such actions as would be reasonably within their power to prevent or minimize such a loss of life until guidance could be obtained from the Landing Force Commander (CTF 62) who has been specifically authorized to determine what action should be taken. Obviously, any such action would call for the exercise of the professional judgment and good sense which we expect of our military personnel.

Nonetheless, it should not be assumed that we either expect or intend that they become involved in hostilities. This is clearly not the case. Our personnel do not have a combat role, and are not sent into situations where hostilities appear likely; special arrangements have been made, and special precautions taken, to provide for their safety.

To date, our personnel have not had to resort to force in self-defense, nor has any attempt been made to forcibly obstruct the performance of their duties. The only U.S. casualties to date were the result of the tragic but accidental detonation of munitions being cleared at the Beirut airport on September 30, which in no way involved hostile action directed against our forces. While random acts of violence can never be ruled out, we have no reason at present to expect that our personnel will become involved in hostilities in the Beirut area.

Question 4. Beyond the War Powers Act, do you plan to ask for legislative authority for the MNF from the Congress as you did for the MFO forces in the Sinai?

Answer. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was developed in the Sinai in April 1982 to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel signed on March 29, 1979. The treaty had contemplated the supervision of detailed security arrangements by United Nations Forces and and Observers. When the President of the U.N. Security Council indicated in May 1981 that such a deployment of a U.N. force would not be possible, Israel and Egypt negotiated a Protocol to the treaty with the assistance of the United States. This Protocol provided for establishment of an alternative multinational peacekeeping force not under U.N. auspices. At the time the Protocol was signed on August 3, 1981, the United States agreed to pay a share of the costs of the MFO and to be one of the initial troop-contributing countries, subject to Congressional approval.

During the deliberations that preceded the negotiation of the Protocol, and throughout the negotiations, the Administration consulted closely with the concerned committees of Congress. A legislative proposal was not submitted, however, until the negotiations were completed in July 1981. The legislation, establishing terms and conditions on U.S. participation in and funding for the MFO, was enacted on December 29, 1981, as Public Law 97-132, 3 months before the initial deployment of United States and other participating forces to the Sinai and the withdrawal by Israel in accordance with the treaty.

In Lebanon the current U.S. presence is based upon bilateral notes which were exchanged between the Governments of the MNF—contributing countries and the Government of Lebanon. The principal difference between the deployment of U.S. forces to the Sinai in the MFO and the deployment of U.S. forces to Lebanon with the MNF is that the MNF is presently deployed to Beirut for a limited period to assist the Lebanese authorities in carrying out their responsibilities for restoring the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area, thereby ensuring the safety of the population and an end to the violence. We are not contemplating long-term presence in Lebanon as we do for the MFO in the Sinai. However, if negotiations succeed, and the other necessary arrangements are concluded, we may be faced with establishing a broader MNF role in Lebanon on extremely short notice. While we can anticipate the general requirements for such a force, there are many issues including final composition of the expanded MNF, its precise mission and the duration of its deployment, which will not be clarified before these negotiations are concluded.

The formulation of any legislative proposal on this subject under these circumstances would confront a substantial dilemma. Such legislation would either have to grant very broad and general authority to the President or else impose constraints based upon assumptions about future deployments in the ongoing negotiating process with little basis for confidence that those assumptions would prove correct. Consequently, we do not think it is practicable to proceed with a request for legislative authority for the MNF from the Congress at this point.

Question 5. Are U.S. Marines in Beirut receiving any kind of special pay because of their duty as part of the MNF?

Answer. U.S. Armed Forces currently serving in the MNF in Lebanon are only getting the normal pay and allowance that they receive while on sea duty or when assigned to foreign posts. Married members also get a family separation allowance. They do not receive combat pay, hostile fire pay or any other special financial compensation for serving in the MNF in Lebanon.

Question 6. Phil Habib previously told members of the Committee his success in negotiating the withdrawal of the PLO and the Syrians from West Beirut was due in part to his ability to isolate the Beirut question from the broader Middle East issue. Now he is the personification of the linkage between these two issues. Is it desirable to unlink the two issues? Is it possible?

Answer. The moderate Arab states increasingly have tended to link Lebanon and the peace process. Therefore, as a practical matter, it is not possible to consider events in Lebanon in isolation from the broader issue of peace in the Middle East. U.S. interests are engaged in both Lebanon and the peace process and the President is determined to pursue both along parallel tracks and to see both through to success. We hope that forward movement in either area will serve to stimulate progress in the other.

Question 7. What is the relationship between our policy in Lebanon and the overall peace process?

Answer. United States, interests are engaged both in Lebanon and in the broader peace process. The President is therefore determined to pursue both along parallel tracks and to see both through to success. We hope that forward movement in either area will serve to stimulate progress in the other.

Question 8. The Israelis and the Egyptians have never fully agreed on the role the United States should play in the peace process. The Israelis believe we should be mediators while the Egyptians insist President Carter committed the United States to being a "full-partner." What is our role?

Answer. The Camp David Accords specify that "The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for carrying out of the obligations of the parties." In a joint letter from Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to President Carter, dated March 26, 1979, the parties agreed, "the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of the negotiations."

Under these provisions, we believe it clear that the United States' role is not in any way a limited one. Throughout the period of negotiations, the United States has felt free to express its views on the issues under discussion, if we believed that an expression of our views would be helpful. We also felt free to suggest alternatives to the parties, and ways of bridging the different views held by the parties. We intend, in any negotiations, to continue to "participate fully in all stages."

Question 9. The President launched his initiative on September 1. Little progress appears to have been made to date and many observers believe the process is already hopelessly stalled or soon will be. How much time do we have before the President's initiative will be generally considered a failure?

Answer. It is erroneous to assert that little progress has been made to date, or that the process is hopelessly stalled. Since September 1, we have engaged in a series of meetings with officials from countries in the area and others. There is a constant diplomatic activity among the Arabs—witness the Arab Summit in Fes which produced, for the first time, an Arab consensus on making peace with Israel. King Hussein will be here later this month. Ambassador Habib is in the area discussing the peace process, as well as Lebanon, and we will be seeing President Mubarak here in January.

It would be foolish to set a time limit, or to assert that progress must be made by a particular date. Events in the area are moving, there is progress, and so long as there is progress, the initiative should be given time to work.

Question 10. What will be the cost if we fail to move the peace process forward?

Answer. The costs of failure to move the peace process forward would be sig-

nificant. We have an historic opportunity now to achieve a just and lasting peace in the area. Vital American interests are at stake. So long as the states in the area have not made peace, they will likely feel required to devote significant amounts to arms, preventing other programs of greater benefit to the peoples of the area from being funded. Our overall diplomatic efforts and credibility may also be damaged.

I would like to emphasize, however, that we have not failed to move the process forward. It is therefore premature to attempt to address the costs of failure, except in the most abstract way.

Question 11. President Gemayel has requested an increase in the number of troops in the multinational force. Is this necessary? What will more American troops contribute to Lebanese security? When will our forces be withdrawn?

Answer. We are considering the Government of Lebanon's request for an increase in the number of U.S. troops in the MNF. A decision on this matter has not been made as yet. While we certainly would intend to withdraw U.S. forces from Lebanon as soon as possible, we cannot set a fixed date at this time.

The Government of Lebanon has requested an increase in the MNF because of its assessment that greater international participation will be necessary to supplement the Lebanese Armed Forces for a time in providing confidence in the security arrangements for the departure of all external forces from Lebanon. Until such arrangements are negotiated, we cannot be certain of the requirements for U.S. forces. Meanwhile, we are working to enhance the capability and strength of the Lebanese Army so that it may eventually assume its full security responsibilities in Lebanon.

Question 12. The Israelis are asking for reasonable security arrangements for their northern border. What will these arrangements entail? How long might it take to work them out?

Answer. The Israeli Government has spoken publicly of certain requirements which it believes necessary to ensure the security of Israel's northern border. Among these requirements are:

Lebanese agreement to prevent acts of hostility from its territory;

Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon;

A security zone in southern Lebanon with limitations on types of arms permitted in the zone;

Incorporation of militias in southern Lebanon into the Lebanese army;

Continuing Lebanese-Israeli contacts on security.

At this point we cannot predict whether the Lebanese Government would accept the Israeli proposals or how long it would take to implement security arrangements. This has to be determined through negotiations.

Question 13. Recently, the primary effort has been directed toward arranging a format for Israeli-Lebanese discussions. Even if Israeli-Lebanese differences on format are resolved, how are Syrian and Palestinian views going to be brought into the discussions?

Answer. The Government of Lebanon has initiated a dialogue with Syria and with the PLO aimed at withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon. We would expect these talks to proceed along with the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.

Question 14. When does the Administration believe the next withdrawal of foreign troops will take place? Are further partial withdrawals likely as interim steps? When will all the Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian forces be withdrawn?

Answer. We are pressing all concerned to agree to a departure of external forces from Lebanon as soon as possible. We are convinced this can be done expeditiously, but cannot provide a date by which we expect a full withdrawal. The exact manner of withdrawal remains, of course, to be agreed.

Question 15. There have been reports that 1,200 Palestinians have been massacred in Lebanon since the events in Shatila and Sabra. Is there any truth to these rumors?

Answer. These rumors are false.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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